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That many of our most successful scientific theories involve one or 
more idealizations poses a challenge to traditional accounts of 
theory confirmation. One popular response amongst scientific 
realists is the “Improvement Model of Confirmation”: if tightening 
up one or more of the idealizations leads to greater predictive 
accuracy, then this supports the belief that the theory’s inaccuracy 
is a result of its idealizations and not because it is wrong. In this 
article I argue that the improvement model is deeply flawed and that 
therefore idealizations continue to undermine “success-to-truth” 
arguments for scientific realism. 
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1  Introduction  
Scientific realists contend that the predictive and explanatory success of a 
scientific theory is a good guide to believing in its truth or approximate truth.  
However, many of our most successful scientific theories involve laws with one 
or more idealizations and are therefore known to be false.  Famous examples of 
idealizations include point masses, rigid rods, infinite densities, and perfect 
vacuums. A common response among realists is that such theories can still be 
believed to be approximately true because tightening up one or more of the 
idealizations leads to greater predictive accuracy. This provides evidence—so 
the account goes—that a non-idealized true theory exists that our best current 
theory approximates. 
This account, which I will dub the “Improvement Model of Confirmation”, 
is most often associated with Ronald Laymon (1980, 1985, 1989, 1995); but 
other versions of it can be found in Leszek Nowak (1980), Ernan McMullin 
(1985), James Derden (2003), Michael Weisberg (2007) and Jose Rolleri 
(2013). That it continues to go unchallenged is surprising, as it seems to me to 
be deeply flawed. In this short article I assess the Improvement Model of 
Confirmation and raise what I take to be its most fundamental difficulties. I start 
by explaining why well-known approaches to confirmation struggle to 
accommodate scientific theories with idealizations and outline the most 
essential features of Laymon’s version of the improvement model. I then raise 
a number of objections to it before considering a potential response courtesy of 
Clark Glymour’s condition for bootstrap confirmation. It will be shown that this 
addition ultimately fails to save the improvement model. As a result, the fact our 
most successful theories to date involve idealizations undermines “success-to-
truth” arguments and poses a serious challenge to scientific realism. 
 
2  The improvement model of confirmation 
Traditional models of confirmation do not fare well in explaining how 
theories that include idealizations are accepted in scientific practice. This can be 
illustrated by appealing to a well-known idealized theory: the kinetic theory of 
gases. At the heart of this theory is the Boyle-Charles law, typically written as: 
 
PV = nRT 
 
Where P is pressure, V is volume, T temperature, n number of moles of gas 
and R the gas constant. This law is said to hold true only for gases that satisfy 
certain idealization assumptions, the most important of which include: 
 
I1 = The particles of gas are small hard spheres that occupy no volume 





I2 = Each particle collision is perfectly elastic and frictionless 
I3 = There are no intermolecular forces between the particles or long-range 
forces acting on the particles 
I4 = The gas is homogenous and the particles indistinguishable 
 
As none of these assumptions are true for any empirically observed gas, 
simple inductive confirmation by instances is ruled-out because—strictly-
speaking—there are no instances of gas that satisfy these assumptions. Bayesian 
confirmation theory also struggles to explain how the theory can be supported 
by observation. According to Bayesians, prior beliefs in a hypothesis ought to 
be revised consistently with Bayes’ Theorem: 
 
P(H/E) = P(E/H) x P(H) / P(E) if P(E) > 0 
 
In the theorem, P(H) is a measure of the experimenter's prior probability that 
H is true. However, if H is a prediction based on an idealized theory, then the 
experimenter already knows for certain that H is false. In other words, that its 
prior probability is 0. Regardless of whether E occurs the probability of H given 
E is also 0 and therefore confirmation by E cannot take place. 
The hypothetico-deductive method and its derivatives equally fall silent 
when it comes to idealized theories. In its simplest form it claims that 
confirmation is the reverse relation of deduction: if a hypothesis H can be 
deduced from a theory T using background assumptions and initial conditions, 
then T receives confirmation provided H is empirically observed. But once again 
we know that our prediction based on an idealized theory will not match that 
observed. The only time this might happen is if there is a fortunate cancelling 
out of idealizations that only an unfortunate practitioner would take as 
confirmation of their theory. 
A staple response among realists is that confirmation of idealized theories 
can be attained using the methods above if we infer not to the truth of the theory 
but to its “approximate truth”.  The world is a complicated and messy place, so 
they argue, and idealization assumptions are needed to make prediction 
computationally tractable. Provided the experimental observations do not 
deviate too much from the theory, then we can say it has been confirmed to be 
approximately true.  
The problems with this reply are twofold. Firstly, a measure of approximate 
truth has been notoriously difficult to pin down and no widely accepted theory 
exists that allows us to say just how much truth a theory contains. Secondly, 
even if such a measure were possible, it raises questions about how much 
approximate truth is needed for rational acceptance. As Chuang Liu (1999) has 
made clear, a useful idealization need not always be a good approximation: 





produce unacceptable deviances. There is only a short range of initial conditions 
that provide “good enough” predictions from idealized theories; but why should 
these be said to be supporting evidence when other larger error-inducing setups 
are ignored? 
As a remedy to some of these problems several realist philosophers have 
proposed that idealized theories can be confirmed if the measure of approximate 
truth is made relative to a non-idealized true theory. I will be focussing here on 
Laymon's account as he has developed it in the most detail over the past three 
decades; however, I am confident that the problems inherent in his account carry 
over to all other versions. 
The basic strategy goes that if a perfectly true theory exists with no 
idealizations, then it stands to reason that another theory (which contains 
systematic deviances from it) is approximately true relative to that theory. For 
example, in the case of the Boyle-Charles gas law, the final true non-idealized 
theory is one that allows for things such as the size of the molecules, their 
intermolecular forces and energy escaping through their collisions. Of course, 
in practice, scientists are in the dark about the final true theories, but they do 
have their idealized theories. If it can be shown that these theories are “in-
principle improvable”, so that when their idealization conditions have been 
removed, we are left only with a perfectly true theory, then we can infer their 
approximate truth relative to that final theory.  
Laymon sums up this intuition in what we might call his “Improvability 
Principle”: 
 
Improvability Principle: If a set of fundamental laws is true, then we can 
make in principle sufficient corrections so as to yield better predictions. (1989, 
359) 
 
The reason why Laymon only calls for “in-principle improvability” is down 
to the fact that there are limitations to a scientist’s computational and practical 
resources that make it almost impossible for deidealization to be carried out 
beyond a few steps. Nonetheless, Laymon argues that even though such 
improvements are possible in only a small number of cases, this provides 
inductive evidence that they are fully improvable in principle (1985, 156-157; 
1989, 359). 
From the Improvability Principle Laymon derives two rules, one for 
confirmation and the other for disconfirmation: 
 
Rule-1: A scientific theory is confirmed (or receives confirmation) if it can 
be shown that using more realistic idealizations will lead to more accurate 
predictions. 





Rule-2: A scientific theory is disconfirmed if it can be shown that using more 
realistic idealizations will not lead to more accurate predictions. (1985, 155.) 
 
Laymon does not intend these rules to stand alone: they are meant to 
supplement one's preferred method of confirmation for ordinary non-idealized 
theories. Nevertheless, as I will now argue, these rules cannot help a realist 
explain how idealized theories are confirmed in scientific practice. 
 
3  A critique of the improvement model 
If the Improvability Principle is correct then finding instances from the 
history of science that satisfy rules 1 and 2 would provide a good case for 
arguing that our current theories are approximately true vis-a-vis some unknown 
true non-idealized theory. But why should somebody already sceptical of 
realism accept the principle in the first place? At present, scientists have never 
uncovered a fully de-idealized theory, and so there are no complete examples to 
support its validity. In fact, I suspect that any intuitive appeal the Improvability 
Principle has comes not from the existence of true theories discovered by 
scientists but from a much weaker principle which we might call the “Reverse 
Improvability Principle”: 
 
Reverse Improvability Principle: If we can make in principle sufficient 
corrections so as to yield better predictions, then a set of fundamental laws is 
true. 
 
This principle does not beg the question against the antirealist by already 
assuming the existence of true scientific theories. It also has strong intuitive 
appeal: if a theory which is false has been corrected, surely this provides 
evidence that some true theory about the target phenomena exists to be 
discovered? Imagine I am playing a game of guessing how many sweets are in 
a jar and my initial guess is 200. Upon being told that I am wrong, I then guess 
250. If I have been told that my new guess is false but more accurate, surely this 
provides reason for thinking that it is only a matter of time before my correction 
process arrives at the true figure? 
Sadly, for the realist the Reverse Improvability Principle lets in too much and 
is too weak a foundation for realism. To show why, first consider the fact that 
any false theory Tf can be in principle corrected for to make it true. Even 
statements of contradiction can be corrected for by removing the offending 
conjunct. To find inductive evidence that a false theory can in principle be 
improved is therefore relatively easy. This means almost all false theories 
approximate some corrected true theory Tt and are therefore approximately true 





can be a realist about almost any theory—provided it has been corrected a 
sufficient number of times. 
Laymon never specifies just how many corrections are sufficient, but going 
on the historical cases he cites, it does not seem to be that many. A realist about 
idealized theories might respond by saying that the problem with the argument 
above is that it does not start with a scientific theory that we know on 
independent grounds to be one that is idealized away from reality. In other 
words, rules 1 and 2 are not meant to apply to all empirically false theories but 
only to those that have known idealization conditions. For example, background 
assumptions such as those from atomic theory tell us that nature is not made up 
of point-sized particles and that therefore any falsity produced by this part of the 
theory is due to idealization. This gives us independent grounds for thinking that 
the kinetic theory of gases and the Boyle-Charles law are false because of 
idealization and not for any other reason. Our background assumptions, 
therefore, can be used to constrain the number of false theories that rules 1 and 
2 are meant to apply to. 
The problem with this response is that short of knowledge of the final true 
theory, we cannot say that our current theory is false because it gets things 
drastically wrong due to ‘brute error’ or because it is the result of using an 
idealization. In fact, even if a clear distinction between these two ways in which 
a theory can be false exists, the problem still stands. Consider the following 
amendment to the Boyle-Charles law: 
 
PV = nRT + k 
 
Where k is some additive constant not significantly different in magnitude 
from the largest error produced by the idealizations. Then this theory, which is 
a hybrid containing some idealized falsity and some brute-error falsity, has been 
corrected or improved by scientists the same number of times as the Boyle-
Charles law and therefore takes an equal share of confirmation—even though 
removal of all the idealization conditions to this law would not lead to some, yet 
undiscovered, true theory. 
 
4  A bootstrapping response? 
Laymon considers whether his original Improvement Model can be 
strengthened with the addition of a bootstrapping condition along the lines of 
Glymour (1980). This additional condition provides further reason, he argues, 
that the improvements are due to deidealization and that therefore the underlying 
theory approximates a true theory: 
 
Consider a situation where the relative realism of idealizations I1 and I2 is 
unknown or indeterminate with respect to some existing background 





standard...Say that, with respect to phenomenon P, idealization I2 produces 
the better prediction. Therefore, assuming the truth of T, our judgement is 
that I2 is the more realistic idealization. Now, let it be the case that T, I1 and 
I2 can be brought to bear on some other phenomenon P'. Then the judgement 
of the relative superiority of I2 means that T, if true, will produce a better 
prediction about P' with I2 than with I1. If such a better prediction is not 
produced, we have reason to believe that T is false. The method is 
appropriately called bootstrapping because we first use the theory to generate 
an appraisal of relative realism; then we test the theory using that appraisal.  
(Laymon 1985, 166) 
 
The idea seems to be that we rely on our main theory and any other 
background assumptions to make a prediction about the relative realism of two 
idealization assumptions. If that prediction is borne out in the experimental data, 
then we use that better idealization to confirm the approximate truth of the 
underlying theory. It is an example of bootstrapping because we are relying on 
the theory to provide an explanation of why one idealization assumption is more 
realistic than another. 
Can the addition of a bootstrap condition like this resolve some of the worries 
raised in section 3? Let us return to the Boyle-Charles gas law and the 
underlying kinetic theory of gases and let us compare two different idealization 
assumptions I1 and I2: 
 
I1 = The particles of gas are small hard spheres that occupy no volume 
I2 = The particles of gas are small hard spheres that occupy n volume where 
n > 0. 
 
These idealization assumptions cannot both be true: either the particles take 
up space or they do not. Given some experimental setup and observations, we 
might make two contrasting predictions about the temperature of the gas. The 
first H1 predicts a temperature based on the Boyle-Charles gas law and the 
second H2 predicts a temperature using a correction for molecular size (as in the 
van der Waal's equation). If H2 is closer in value to the actually measured 
temperature than H1, then we can say that we have evidence that the error is 
caused by a genuine idealization and not for some other fault in the theory of 
gases. 
The problem with Laymon's version of the bootstrap condition is that it is too 
imprecise to provide warrant for the underlying theory. Even if the relative 
realism predictions pan out across a wide range of experimental setups, the fact 
Laymon's account does not require a precise match means it can be too easily 
explained by other means. For instance, just because the use of I2 gives us a 





not provide much evidence for the truth of the underlying theory. Antirealists 
could agree that using I2 produces a theory which is more useful or more 
empirically adequate—but it is a large jump to go from there to the truth of the 
underlying explanation. 
A bootstrap condition closer to what Glymour originally had in mind might 
do better. Instead of using the background theory to predict the relative realism 
of two idealizations, what the realist needs is a prediction of the precise value a 
law will deviate from the values observed. The odds of the size of deviance 
matching that predicted when the underlying explanation was at fault seems 
remote and therefore gives significant reason to believe in the truth of the 
underlying theory. This is more in keeping with Glymour's original account 
because it requires the theory, idealizations, and observations to be consistent 
with one another, not just in terms of best fit but actual fit. 
In practice this would require using our theory and idealizations to make a 
prediction about what the error size would be between our idealized theory and 
the actual measurement. Of course, for a theory with multiple idealizations it is 
going to be difficult to confirm the prediction when the observed value will be 
affected by other perturbing factors not incorporated into the prediction. And 
here is where a bootstrapping response ultimately comes unstuck. For it to be 
successful we would need to do either one of two things: (1) make predictions 
for the errors of all the idealization assumptions or (2) screen-off the effects of 
other perturbing factors. The first of these is not feasible by assumption because 
we have already seen that scientists lack the computational resources required 
to deidealize theories in their entirety. The second is also not possible because, 
as McMullin (1985, 267) reminds us, not all idealization assumptions can be 
screened-off through good experimental design. If our idealization is that the 
light waves are passing through a “perfect vacuum”, then although we might be 
able to approach this, we can never truly replicate it. Experiments designed to 
screen other idealizations such as “the solar system is a two-bodied system” and 
“the pendulum is infinitely long” are clearly not feasible. 
 
5  Conclusion 
The fact a false theory can be improved in practice gives little reason to 
support the idea that it approximates a true theory. Many false theories can be 
improved in this way and if this counts as valid confirmation realists would need 
to accept as true too many false theories. Attempts to limit the falsity to only 
those that involve legitimate idealizations fails because there is no practical way 





of knowing whether the deviances in our theory are caused by idealizations or 
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